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What Moves Capital to Transition Economies?
PIETRO GARIBALDI, NADA MORA, RATNA SAHAY, and 
JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER*
The transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1991
and 1999 differed widely in terms of total capital flows and the share and compo-
sition of private flows. With some exceptions (notably Russia), the main source of
private inflows was foreign direct investment. Portfolio investment was volatile,
and concentrated in a handful of countries. Regressions show that direct invest-
ment can be well explained in terms of economic fundamentals, whereas the pres-
ence of a financial market infrastructure and a property rights indicator are the
only explanatory variables that seem to have a robust effect on portfolio invest-
ment. [JEL F21, F32, P27]
C
ross-border capital flows are an important part of the transition story. Access
to external financing determines the size of the current account deficit that a
country can run when it is reorienting its production and consumption structures
and rebuilding its capital stock. So, there may be a link between the ability to
attract capital inflows and the speed of transition. Moreover, the composition of
capital flows likely affects how much they are associated with the transmission of
know-how and changes in corporate governance, and the degree to which they are
subject to sudden reversals. Finally, the magnitude, composition, and stability of
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Research assistance by Grace Juhn and Haiyan Shi is gratefully acknowledged.capital flows during transition may be indicative of broader aspects of the transi-
tion process. How long did the economy rely mainly on official and exceptional
financing, such as debt rescheduling? How large and volatile were portfolio
inflows? What was the role of private inflows other than FDI and portfolio
investment?
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, it seeks to document the magni-
tude and composition of capital flows to the transition economies of Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union from the early 1990s until 1999. We
describe the main trends in time, as well as cross-sectional variation between the
main regions, and within regions. We particularly highlight cross-country hetero-
geneity in the behavior of (foreign) direct investment and portfolio investment,
which played an important role in many countries as a source of financing and—
in the case of portfolio investment—as a source of macroeconomic volatility. We
then explore to what extent inward direct investment and portfolio investment
flows in time and across countries can be accounted for using individual country
characteristics and some common controls. The narrow focus on inward direct
investment and portfolio investment (as opposed to a broader capital flows
concept) enables us to interpret the empirical regularities we find in terms of the
behavior of private foreign investors.
Existing analyses of aggregate capital flows to transition economies concen-
trate primarily on the determinants and effects of foreign direct investment flows
to Central and Eastern Europe (see, in particular, Lansbury, Pain, and Smidkova,
1996; Holland and Pain, 1998; Brenton, di Mauro, and Lücke, 1999; and Bevan
and Estrin, 2000). This study takes a broader view, characterizing capital flows
more generally and exploring a wide range of potential determinants of both direct
investment and portfolio investment in a larger sample of 25 transition economies
that include the countries of the former Soviet Union. To our knowledge, the only
study that adopts a similar perspective is Claessens, Oks, and Polastri, (1998), who
analyze capital flows for 21 transition economies until 1996. Claessens, Oks, and
Polastri provide more qualitative and descriptive country information than we do,
particularly on the early transition years, and run some regressions for broader
capital flow aggregates in addition to foreign direct and portfolio investment. Our
paper analyzes in more detail the heterogeneity of levels and composition of
capital flows to transition economies in quantitative terms, and covers three more
years of data.1 In view of the relatively large data set, we are able to consider a
wider range of potential explanatory variables for direct investment and portfolio
investment flows than the earlier literature and use standard specification search
techniques to arrive at a parsimonious model rather than assuming a small number
of potential determinants from the outset.
In addition, this paper contains some new data work. We build on the direct
investment and portfolio investment data published in the IMF’s 2000 Balance of
Payment Statistics Yearbook by extending it for the earlier years and filling in the
missing values using information from other sources, including IMF desk
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1For a survey of the recent past, see also the EBRD’s Transition Report 2000, which emphasizes
developments during 1999–2000.economists. To control for direct legal restrictions to both direct investment and
portfolio investment flows in our regressions, we also created indices of direct
investment and portfolio investment restrictions based on qualitative information
recorded in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions.
The paper highlights both the quantitative importance of capital flows to tran-
sition economies as a group—which, since about 1993, have been higher than the
average flows to other emerging market economies—and the high degree of
heterogeneity across the transition countries. Foreign direct investment was gener-
ally the most important source of private capital, but portfolio investment also
played a major role in a handful of countries, as did bank lending. Russia stands
out as a special case in many respects: in spite of substantial official financing, it
was a net exporter of capital over the period we study, and until 1998 it attracted
much more portfolio investment than foreign direct investment. The regression
results show that the cross-country pattern of foreign direct investment can be
explained reasonably well by standard macroeconomic fundamentals, including
institutional indicators. However, we find that it is much harder to “explain” the
behavior of portfolio investment.
I. Capital Flows to Transition Economies: The Main Facts
This section presents the main stylized facts regarding the overall level, trends,
and composition of net capital inflows to transition economies. By “net capital
inflows” we mean all recorded net inflows that lead to a net liability vis-à-vis
foreign residents.2 This includes all capital flows, both official and private, except
those based on current transactions, transfers, and unrecorded flows (which would
be classified as “errors and omissions”).
Net capital inflows are disaggregated on the basis of the analytical presenta-
tion of the balance of payments suggested in the Balance of Payments Statistics
Yearbook 2000 (Part 1, p. xi), into five categories: (foreign) direct investment,
portfolio investment, other investment, use of IMF credit and loans, and excep-
tional financing. Exceptional financing comprises debt forgiveness and arrears
accumulation. Portfolio investment includes investment in both debt and equity
securities below a certain threshold (usually 10–20 percent of total equity; above
that threshold, the transaction would be considered a direct investment). “Other”
investment is a broad category including trade credits, deposits, and loans. Direct
investment and portfolio investment are virtually all private. Other investment is
mainly private, but also includes non-IMF official loans.
We first present the main facts on the level and composition of capital flows
for transition economies as a whole and their main subgroups, and then look at the
cross-country distribution of direct investment and portfolio flows.
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2In the standard classification of the balance of payments (see IMF, 2000, Part 1), this is equal to the
balance on the financial account minus changes in reserve assets.Level and Composition of Flows to Transition Economies
A broad comparison of capital flows to transition economies with flows to
other emerging markets and developing countries is presented in Figure 1. Even at
this level of aggregation, we show flows to Russia separately, given the size of its
economy (30–40 percent of the transition group, in terms of both GDP and popu-
lation) and the fact that it is quite atypical, as we shall see. Figure 1a shows that
total net inflows to transition economies excluding Russia have been consistently
above both the overall developing country average and the average to Latin
America and Southeast Asia since 1995.3 Net flows to Russia have been consis-
tently smaller, reflecting in part Russia’s current account surpluses over the period.
The lower two panels of Figure 1 show the two main items of private capital
flows that are the focus of this paper: direct investment and portfolio investment.
Direct investment exhibits a similar pattern across country groups, with the excep-
tion of Russia. Not counting Russia, direct investment inflows into transition
economies are high, somewhat higher than in other emerging markets, and
followed a sharply rising trend (even as a percentage of GDP). In Russia, net direct
investment inflows were much smaller, and direct investment in dollar levels fell
in 1998 and 1999; however, this was more than offset by the sharp reduction in
dollar GDP (by over 30 percent) resulting from the 1998 devaluation.
Before 1997, portfolio investments to transition economies excluding Russia
were generally below the international average. Since then, they have been about
average or slightly above average—that is, transition economies other than Russia
seem to have been somewhat less affected by the post-1997 contraction in
emerging market financing. In the case of Russia, there were no inflows until 1995
followed by a sharp bubble that peaked in the first half of 1998 and that was
followed by outflows after the August crisis. Since annual inflows for 1998 are an
average of precrisis inflows and postcrisis outflows, the peak shows in 1997 in the
annual data.
Moving to a more disaggregated picture of capital flows to transition
economies, Figure 2 looks at total flows and the composition of flows for five
groups of countries: Central and Eastern Europe (“CEE,” comprising the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia); Southeastern Europe
(“SEE,” comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia), the three Baltic
countries, Russia, and the remaining countries of the former Soviet Union (other
FSU). We show net inflows over the longest transition period consistent with
stable group membership. Because of missing data, particularly in the early tran-
sition years, this leads to slightly different starting periods for each group.4
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3By “total net capital inflows” we mean all recorded net inflows that lead to a net liability vis-à-vis
foreign residents. In the standard classification of the balance of payments (see IMF, 2000) this is equal
to the balance on the financial account minus net changes in reserve assets. This definition excludes
unrecorded flows (which are part of “net errors and omissions”) and capital transfers, but is otherwise very
broad; in particular, it includes some forms of exceptional financing (such as arrears accumulation) as well
as lending by the IMF and other official creditors.
4Because of lack of data, the “other FSU” group excludes four countries: Georgia, Tajikistan,
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Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database 2000; IMF, International Financial Statistics; and authors'  
calculations.      However, the findings of the figure are quite robust to changes in the definition of
the time window; in particular, they would not be affected by either choosing the
same period in calendar time (1995–99) or in transition time (say, 1993–97 for
Central-Eastern and Southeastern Europe, and 1995–99 for the others).5
Figure 2 shows stark differences in both the levels and the composition of
capital flows to the region. The Baltic countries received by far the largest inflows
as a percentage of GDP (and also in per capita terms) over the period. These
inflows consisted mostly of direct investment and “other investment,” in about
equal proportion; the latter refers mainly to private lending to banks and corpora-
tions. Central-Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, and the other FSU (other than
Russia) come second. In GDP terms, the other FSU received slightly higher total
inflows, while Central-Eastern Europe received higher private inflows (the sum of
direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment) than both
Southeastern Europe and the other FSU. In both dollar and per capita terms,
however (not shown), net inflows were much smaller in the other FSU, reflecting,
in part, their lower levels of development.
Note also the differences in the composition of flows across the three country
groups. In Central-Eastern Europe, the main source of net inflows was direct
investment, followed by sizable portfolio investment and other investment (mostly
private lending). IMF financing was actually negative over the period, reflecting
the repayment of loans prior to 1993, and there was almost no “exceptional
financing.” In Southeastern Europe, there were almost no net portfolio inflows,
and both direct investment and other investment were important sources of private
financing. In the other countries of the former Soviet Union, finally, almost all
private inflows took the form of direct investment, with very little private lending
and almost no net portfolio investment (as we shall see in the next figure, there
were some portfolio investment inflows prior to the 1998 crisis, but they are offset
by outflows after the crisis). Instead, the bulk of nondirect investment financing
was official lending, primarily by the IMF and the World Bank, and “exceptional
financing,” which comprises increases in external arrears (mainly to Russia and
other energy exporters such as Turkmenistan) and debt reschedulings. Debt
reschedulings also played an important role in Southeastern Europe.
Figure 2 shows again that Russia is highly unusual, in several respects. First,
it is unique in experiencing cumulative net outflows over 1994–99. Given its status
as a large commodities exporter, this is not in itself surprising. The “errors and
omissions” in Russia’s balance of payments were consistently negative and large
(since 1995, about 2.5 percent of GDP on average). If “errors and omissions,”
which often reflect some form of capital flight that have not been officially
Pietro Garibaldi,Nada Mora,Ratna Sahay,and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
114
5The source of the data in Figures 2 and 3 is the IMF’s 2000 Balance of Payments Yearbook (analyt-
ical presentation), or equivalently, the International Financial Statistics. These data have the advantage of
being consistently compiled, but the disadvantage of containing major gaps in coverage. For this reason,
in the first (February 1999) draft of this paper, which considered annual data until 1997, data were
obtained directly from IMF desk economists for the purposes of this overview. By the time we revised the
paper, we felt that the coverage of the IFS had sufficiently improved to warrant switching to that source,
which has the advantage of being public. This said, large gaps remain, particularly for the earlier transi-
tion years. These gaps are not an issue in Figures 1b and 1c and also in our regressions, which use longer
series for direct and portfolio investments compiled from several sources (see below).recorded, were to be included in the definition of capital flows, net capital
outflows from Russia would be even larger. Second, and perhaps more surprising,
foreign direct investment was comparatively small. On a cumulative basis, it was
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SourceS: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and authors' calculations. 
Regional definitions: Central-eastern Europe includes Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia); Southeastern Europe excludes Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia due to data 
incompletness (i.e., Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania); FSU stands for "former Soviet Union." In Figure 2 
and 3 the "other FSU" group comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and 


















Figure 2.  Total Capital Flows (net), by Region
(in percent of GDP in the same period)
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12overshadowed by substantial net portfolio inflows, large “exceptional financing”
(debt reschedulings and increases in arrears), and even IMF loans. However, all
these financing items together were more than offset by very large outflows of
“other” investment, mostly of the private sector. This is usually interpreted as
capital flight.6
Figure 3 presents the composition of flows at each point in time. Data for 1991
and 1992 for the Central-Eastern Europe and Southeastern Europe groups have
been added since they were available for these groups. Direct investment as a share
of GDP followed an upward trend in all country groups except for Russia. Given
the experience of positive growth in most transition economies following the
initial “transitional recession,” this implies a much sharper trend in dollar levels of
direct investment, or in direct investment per capita. The figure also shows the
“bubble” in portfolio investment in Russia, the “other FSU” countries and, to a
lesser extent, Southeastern Europe prior to the 1998 crash. In 1998 itself, net port-
folio investment was still large and positive in Russia, as pre-crisis inflows were
not completely offset by the post-August collapse, but already negative in the
“other FSU” group. In 1999, however, it was negative in both cases.
Figure 3 also illustrates the changing role of exceptional financing and IMF
lending. With one exception—Bulgaria, which received large IMF financing in
1997 in connection with a successful exchange-rate based stabilization program—
the role of IMF lending as a significant net source of financing in Central and
Eastern Europe, Southeastern Europe, and Baltic countries was limited broadly to
the first years of transition (up to 1992 for Central and Eastern Europe, reflecting
Polish debt restructuring, 1994 for Southeastern Europe, and 1995 for the Baltics).
In Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet Union, however, it remained
significant until 1998. “Exceptional financing” was nonexistent in the Baltics, and
plays a role in Central and Eastern Europe only in the early years (up to, and
including, 1993). Southeastern Europe is an intermediate case, with exceptional
financing on a declining path, but still exceeding 1 percent of GDP on average
until 1996, and remaining at close to 0.4 percent of GDP since then. In Russia and
the other countries of the former Soviet Union, exceptional financing was impor-
tant throughout the period. While it seems to have been on a declining path until
1997, it jumped back in the aftermath of the Russian crisis of 1998.
Cross-Country Distribution of Direct Investment and Portfolio Flows
In this subsection we disaggregate the two types of capital flows that are the
subject of our econometric analysis in the next section—direct investment and
portfolio investment. Unlike the previous subsection, which takes a net (inward
plus outward) flows perspective, here we look at inward foreign direct investment
and portfolio investment. We do this to simplify the interpretation of the results
from the regression analyses, as reflecting the decisions of foreign investors. In
practice, however, the inward flows and the net flows series are quite correlated,
because the investments by transition economy residents abroad that were
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Figure 3.  Composition of Capital Flows (net), by Region and Over Time
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Notes: FSU denotes former Soviet Union. Due to data incompleteness for the earlier transition years, 
Macedonia is excluded from the Central-eastern Europe group in this figure, and data prior to 1993 
excludes Croatia. For the same reason, Georgia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are excluded 
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f. Southeastern Europe: 1993–99
 recorded as outward direct investment and portfolio investment flows are rela-
tively small.
Note that even inward direct investment and portfolio investment are “net
concepts” in the sense that they reflect the sum of net flows to transition
economies with outflows due to the liquidation and repatriation of assets owned
by foreign residents. In the period we are studying, this plays little role for inward
direct investment, which is always positive or zero, but it does play an important
role for inward portfolio investment, which is negative in some countries, in
particular, due to outflows in 1998 and 1999 (see Figures 4 and 5, and the
Appendix Tables in Garibaldi and others, 2002, for the complete series).
In addition to inward portfolio investment from the balance of payments, we
also show a related concept, namely, bond, equity, and loan issues in international
financial markets (Figure 6). The sum of bonds and equity overlaps with the defi-
nition of inward portfolio flows, but differs from this definition in two important
respects. First, it only captures primary market issues, that is, it ignores any
secondary market activity (and thus all outflows). Second, it ignores domestic
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Figure 4.  Inward Foreign Direct Investment 1992–99, by Country
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05 0 0 1 000 1500 2000issues, which may, in part, be purchased by foreigners and thus give rise to capital
inflows (as was the case, for example, with the Russian GKO issues). The main
reason for reporting bond, equity, and loan issues even though the concept misses
important components of portfolio investment is that we know exactly what is
reported, and that it is much less likely to contain errors than the direct investment
and portfolio investment data. The latter are compiled from individual country
authorities, which may have weak reporting systems, particularly in the early tran-
sition years. In contrast, international issues data are collected from the major
financial centers and involve no serious reporting problems. Moreover, the gross
international issue series receives considerable attention from the major financial
markets.
The data underlying Figures 4 and 5 (see Table A1 in Garibaldi and others,
2002), is an extension of data published in the International Financial Statistics.
Missing values, and in particular data for the earlier years, were filled in using
information from IMF desk economists, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook
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1995–97 portfolio investment liabilities                 1998–99 portfolio investment liabilities
Figure 5.  Portfolio Investment Liabilities 1995–99, by Country
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–200 0 200 400 600 800database and—for the early transition years of some Central European
economies—data provided by Claessens, Oks, and Polastri (1998). The data
underlying Figure 6 come from the IMF’s Emerging Market Bonds, Equities and
Loans database, which underlies the IMF’s quarterly Emerging Market Financing.
The main lesson of Figures 4–6 is that there is heterogeneity of inward direct
investment and portfolio investment (we refer from now on only to inward invest-
ment), even within some of the broad country groups classified in the previous
subsection. A look at the cross-country distribution of foreign direct investment
(Figure 4) yields some surprises. Few would have guessed that Azerbaijan is the
direct investment leader in the transition group, by a large margin, when direct
investment is measured as a percentage of GDP, or that Armenia edges out the
Czech Republic and Poland as a recipient of direct investment as a share of GDP.
In part, this truly reflects unusually high direct investment, for reasons which we
will be exploring in the next subsection (for example, oil-related investments in
Azerbaijan), but it may also have to do with problems with measuring (dollar)
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120
1992–99 bonds             1992–99 equities             1992–99 Loans
Figure 6.  Bond, Equity, and Loan Issues in International Markets 
 1992–99, by Country
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05 0 0 1 000 1500 2000 3000 2500GDP. It is well known that the initial output decline may have been exaggerated in
several transition countries, particularly in the former Soviet Union.7 Perhaps
more important, dollar GDP is computed using market exchange rates, which were
probably strongly undervalued, particularly in the early transition years and in the
countries of the former Soviet Union.8 For these reasons, it may be preferable to
use either PPP-adjusted GDP or population to scale direct investment flows.
Figure 4 shows that the choice of normalization has a significant impact on the
cross-country rankings. After scaling by population, the Central-Eastern European
countries and the Baltic countries appear as clear direct investment leaders.
However, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are still leaders in the “other FSU” group,
suggesting that natural resource endowments may be an important factor driving
direct investment flows.
The portfolio investment and bond, equity, and loan issue rankings (Figures 5
and 6) are relatively less sensitive to the choice of scale variable. In both cases, the
Central-Eastern European countries, the Baltic countries, and Russia rank ahead
of others. The main surprise of Figure 5 is that the position of Russia as a top
recipient of net inward portfolio investment flows over 1995–99 is not as
pronounced as Figures 1–3 would perhaps have led one to believe. This is due to
the fact that portfolio investment inflows to Russia were extraordinarily large
during only one year, 1997, when they exceeded 4 percent of GDP. In 1995 and
1999, however, Russia suffered negative inward portfolio investment. In contrast,
as Figure 3 showed, Central-Eastern Europe received much more sustained
inflows. Similar observations apply to the bond, equity, and loan issue data.
II. What Moved Capital to Transition Economies? 
Econometric Results
Using panel data for 26 transition economies ranging from the early transition
years (1990–92, depending on the country) to 1999, we explore how well poten-
tial explanatory variables account for the behavior of inward direct investment and
inward portfolio investment flows. We chose these two series for two reasons:
first, because they are important from a policy perspective (for example, because
of their potential impact on growth and structural transformation) and second,
because we have a good idea of what asset classes they contain. That is less clear
in the case of wider flow concepts. The class “other investment,” in particular,
mixes a wide range of different types of flows, from lending by foreign banks to
domestic capital flight, which makes it harder to interpret regression results.
For several reasons, we decided not to include in the regression analysis the
bond, equities, and loans issue series, which was discussed at the end of the
previous subsection. While we know with great precision (asset by asset) what is
included in this series, it would not be easy to interpret the results because primary
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7See, among others, Berg (1993), Gavrilenkov and Koen (1994), and Kaufmann and Kaliberda
(1996).
8See Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) and Krajnyák and Zettelmeyer (1998).issue flows mix decisions about the demand for capital—i.e., the decision to issue
bonds, equities, or loans on the part of domestic authorities and residents—and
decisions by foreign investors to supply capital. A similar identification problem
exists for portfolio investment flows, but to the extent that these reflect inflows and
outflows into an existing asset stock that is traded on secondary markets—as
opposed to primary issues—it is not as severe a problem. At the limit, with large
domestic asset markets, the supply of domestic portfolio assets would be elastic,
enabling us to perfectly identify foreign demand for assets—i.e., to interpret the
coefficients as reflecting foreign investor behavior.9
In the next subsection, we briefly review some methodological issues,
including model selection and the selection of an appropriate scale variable (GDP
or population). We then discuss a set of candidate explanatory variables for the
regression analyses, and then we present our findings.
Methodology
In view of the large set of (possibly correlated) potential determinants of
capital flows to transition economies, a challenge for any econometric exercise is
to maintain a reasonable degree of parsimony while avoiding misspecification of
the model. To deal with this, we used a general-to-specific model selection
approach in the context of a dynamic panel of the form:
yi,t = a0 + a1yi,t–1 + α(L)Xi,t + βZi + εi,t,
where yi,t is the dependent variable (either direct investment or portfolio invest-
ment; see below), Xi,t denotes a vector of time-varying variables, α(L) denotes a
lag polynomial of coefficients, Zi is a vector of initial conditions and time-invariant
controls (e.g. regional dummies), and εi,t is the error term. The time index denotes
years since the beginning of transition, while the index i refers to countries. The
advantage of this approach is that it enables us to “test down” among a reasonably
large set of potential right-hand-side variables in the context of a flexible dynamic
specification. This minimizes the chances of bias due to omitted variables and
inappropriate dynamic restrictions. In practice, the initial lag length was limited to
one or two lags, depending on the variable, given the shortness of our time series.
The presence of a lagged dependent variable precludes the use of the standard
fixed or random effects estimators.10 We  thus used OLS estimates, which are
consistent and efficient only if the model does not contain unobserved country-
specific effects. This means that the specification we start out with must be suffi-
ciently general to contain all country-specific effects that are correlated with other
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9This said, secondary market volume was small relative to new issues in times when markets were
rapidly expanding, such as in Russia prior to the 1998 crisis. For example, the decision to issue GKOs in
1997 was surely driven by variables that also influenced asset demand (e.g., the fiscal balance as a
solvency indicator). We will return to this point when we interpret the results.
10Fixed and random effects rely on a strong exogeneity assumption that is automatically violated in
dynamic panels; see Keane and Runkle (1992).right-hand-side variables, a further reason to start out with a very broad initial
specification.
The main drawback of our approach, as in any general-to-specific exercise, is
the “path dependency” problem—the fact that the parsimonious specification
obtained may be sensitive to the order of elimination, which in turn reflects the
researcher’s priors in giving some variables a relatively better chance to remain in
the model (by ordering them last). It turns out that in this sample there is very little
path dependency, given our initial model. To confirm this, a longer version of this
paper (Garibaldi and others, 2002) supplements the approach described above
with a version of Leamer’s (1983) “Extreme Bounds Analysis,” which tests the
robustness of the main explanatory variables surviving in our parsimonious
models. The models shown below pass these robustness tests except for caveats
pointed out in the text.
A final methodological issue concerns the choice of the variable used to
normalize capital flows—that is, dollar GDP, PPP-adjusted dollar GDP, or popu-
lation. As we saw in the previous subsection, this has a significant impact on the
relative levels of direct investment and (to a lesser extent) portfolio investment
across countries. The standard approach is to normalize using GDP evaluated at
market exchange rates, but this could introduce distortions due to the large fluctu-
ations of both exchange rates and real output in our sample.
Our preferred approach is thus not to impose any particular normalization on
the data, but instead to use unscaled capital flow data (i.e. simply measured in
millions of dollars), while controlling for several alternative scale variables on the
right-hand side. The scale variable that appears to be most relevant from the
perspective of predicting capital flows can then be selected as part of the broader
general-to-specific procedure.11
Explanatory Variables
We divide the potential determinants of capital inflows, beyond the scale vari-
ables discussed in the previous subsection, into three groups: those that are likely
to affect both direct investment and portfolio investment, those that are specific to
direct investment, and those that are specific to portfolio investment.
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11If both the capital flow data and the scale variable enter the regression in natural logs, this encom-
passes the standard approach (which is equivalent to imposing a coefficient of unity on the relationship
between log flows and log GDP) as a special case. In any case, log-transforming the data is appropriate if
one believes that the true structural model is multiplicative—which is just saying that a unit increase in a
right-hand-side variable would always lead to some percentage increase in capital flows per capita, rather
than some absolute increase. The problem is that the log transformation cannot be directly applied when
there are zeros in the data. To deal with this problem, we transformed the DI data by taking the natural
log of 1 + DI. However, with portfolio investment, which contains large negative values, we worked with
untransformed data, and ran all regressions using both a population normalization and a GDP
normalization.General determinants
The basic variables of macroeconomic performance are inflation, the fiscal
balance, and (lagged) growth. Macroeconomic stability is widely viewed by poli-
cymakers, academics, and the press as creating a conducive environment for
foreign investors, so one expects inflation to have a negative effect on capital
inflows. The expected signs on the fiscal balance and growth are more ambiguous.
One view of the fiscal balance is as an alternative stabilization proxy (Fischer,
Sahay, and Végh, 1997); this would imply a positive sign (surpluses are better than
deficits from the point of view of encouraging investment). However, a large
deficit might also proxy a budgetary need for foreign financing—particularly if
inflation has been adequately controlled for but not interest rates—which would
suggest a negative relationship between the fiscal balance and portfolio inflows.
Similarly, the prima facie expectation on the relationship between output growth
and capital flows is probably that investors prefer entering an economy that has
already turned the corner. This could be justified if profitability is related to
domestic demand, or if output declines are associated with disruptions (including
political and social) that are not controlled for through other variables. On the
other hand, the output decline could be viewed as increasing the marginal product
of new capital (by freeing resources held in the traditional sectors) and perhaps as
lowering asset prices.
Indicators of the exchange rate regime include whether or not a preannounced
exchange rate peg was in place, and whether the country had unified the exchange
rate or applied restrictions to convertibility that resulted in multiple exchange rate
practices. To the extent that a peg credibly reduces exchange rate risk, it might
attract higher inflows. Multiple exchange rates and restrictions to convertibility are
typically believed to deter inflows, as they may create obstacles both for the repa-
triation of profits and for the import of intermediate goods that often go hand-in-
hand with direct investment projects.
We  used an indicator of liberalization and privatization, compiled by De
Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996, 1997), and updated using similar indices
compiled by the EBRD. The De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb index is an average of
three subindices, which capture progress in internal (price) liberalization, external
(trade) liberalization, and privatization, respectively. This reflects the view that
countries that are further along in implementing structural reforms and privatizing
will find it easier to attract foreign capital.
Indicators of institutional quality and the legal framework are included to
capture the argument that institutional and legal shortcomings—including unpre-
dictable and burdensome regulation, red tape, confiscatory taxation, and difficul-
ties in enforcing contracts—are important impediments to private business in
general, and particularly to foreign investments in transition countries. We rely on
a set of 5 institutional indicators compiled by the World Bank in their 1997 survey
of perceptions of the quality of governance (see Appendix for details).
Initial conditions and other controls are included to capture potential deter-
minants that are unrelated to policies during the sample period, including natural
resource endowment, location (e.g. distance from Western Europe), pretransition
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encourage inflows: location will affect transportation costs to export markets, and
initial liberalization may have an effect (not just the most recent level of reforms
might matter, but also how long they have been in place). The expected sign on the
war dummy is not entirely obvious: wars should discourage inflows, but may also
attract inflows to the extent that there is a large nonresident community that helps
to finance the war effort (Armenia and Croatia might be examples). We also
included the three-month U.S. treasury bill rate as a basic opportunity cost
variable.
A final question is whether or not to control separately for market (investor)
perceptions, as captured by “country risk” ratings, which are regularly published
in investor magazines such as Euromoney or Institutional Investor. As we explain
in more detail in the Appendix, these are overall indicators of investor perceptions
that give about equal weight to a country’s economic and political/institutional
“performance.” To the extent that we are already controlling for these factors, they
should not matter. Nevertheless, we decided to include market perceptions among
our regressors, for two reasons. First, whether or not perceptions matter even in
the presence of variables that directly control for “fundamentals” is in itself an
interesting question. More important, some institutional indicators are only avail-
able for a subset of our sample. Using market perception indicators to control for
unmeasured institutional factors enables us to use a larger sample.
Thus, current and lagged values of market perceptions are generally included
in the regressions reported below. To make the coefficients of the regression easier
to interpret, we do not include the investor magazine scores directly into the
regression, but rather we use the residuals of a first-stage regression of these scores
on the remaining right-hand-side explanatory variables that were included in the
regression. Thus, the coefficient on our perceptions variable represents the effect
on direct investment of market perceptions that are not attributable to factors that
we are directly controlling for in the regression model.
Specific determinants of direct investment
Beyond the variables discussed so far, there are four sets of variables that
could be relevant specifically for direct investment.
Competitiveness indicators would ideally comprise a measure such as (dollar)
unit labor cost in manufacturing. However, while average wage data in manufac-
turing are generally available, indirect labor costs and productivity data for the
manufacturing sector are much harder to come by on a consistent cross-country
basis. Rather than attempting to compute unit labor costs, we separately include
average monthly dollar wages. Since we control for aggregate productivity differ-
ences across countries by including both population and GDP measures as “scale
variables” in the regression (see last subsection above), our specification encom-
passes aggregate unit labor costs (except for indirect labor costs).
Trade liberalization. Direct investment often takes place in businesses that
either are export-oriented or require imported inputs, or both. In such cases, one
would expect that the more a country’s trade regime has been liberalized the
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EBRD’s index of external liberalization.
Restrictions to direct investment. The extent to which legal barriers that make
foreign direct investment more difficult or more costly varies considerably across
countries. We attempted to construct an index that captures these barriers (see
Appendix for details).
Method of privatization. While the extent of privatization is controlled for, at
least rudimentarily, by the De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb liberalization index (see
above), this disregards the potentially important effect on direct investment of how
a country privatized. Direct sales with equal access by foreigners may offer an
automatic opportunity for direct investment, while insider privatizations (privati-
zation as a sale or gifts to the management and/or workers of a previously state-
owned enterprise) may create barriers.12 To capture this notion, three indicators of
the privatization method based on EBRD information are included in the regres-
sion (see Appendix for details about the construction of these variables).
Specific determinants of portfolio investment
Securities market development. Countries that have more advanced securities
markets and are equipped with a regulatory and legal framework specific to
dealing with such transactions would be expected to receive higher flows of port-
folio investment. One indicator capturing the extent of institutional development
in this area is the EBRD transition indicator on securities markets and nonbank
financial institutions (see next subsection for more details).
Restrictions on portfolio investment. This is analogous to the index on direct
investment restrictions. The construction of an index of portfolio investment
restrictions is described in the Appendix.
Indicators of default risk. The total external debt stock and international
reserves are included as default risk indicators. Both are lagged one year, to reflect
a perceptions lag and avoid endogeneity. In addition, we separately control for the
ratio of short-term debt in total debt. One would expect that countries with lower
short-term debt and higher reserves are less prone to default and hence attract
higher portfolio inflows.
Treasury bill rates. To the extent that we fully control for the factors which
determine default and exchange rate risk, portfolio flows should go to countries
that offer relatively higher real interest rates on their government paper. However,
this effect will be attenuated or reversed to the extent that risk factors have been
omitted, since in this case high interest rates may themselves proxy for these
omitted factors. We used the 3-month treasury bill rate from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS), and filled the gaps as much as possible
with similar short-term rates from country publications and IMF desk economists.
However, there still remained a substantial set of missing observations, which are
typically due to countries and/or years in which treasury bill markets were nonex-
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12See Holland and Pain (1998).istent or in rudimentary stages. To avoid restricting the sample size, we replaced
these missing values by zero entries and at the same time defined a dummy that
takes the value of one when data are available and zero otherwise.13
All the data used as explanatory variables, including sources and the notation
used in the remainder of the paper, are summarized in Table 1. In addition, the
Appendix gives details on the definition and compilation of those explanatory
variables that are new or unusual in the context of a study of determinants of
capital flows to transition economies. These include (1) the indices of restrictions
on direct investment and portfolio flows that we construct for the purposes of this
study; (2) indices of country-risk perceptions; (3) institutional, political, and legal
proxies, particularly those compiled by the World Bank in their 1997 survey; and
(4) indicators of the privatization method, which were also constructed for this
study.
Our sample periods are 1990–99 for Hungary and Poland; 1991–99 for
Bulgaria, Romania; the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic; and 1992–99
for the 19 remaining transition economies (Albania, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and
Slovenia, the 3 Baltic countries, Russia, and 11 other countries of the former
Soviet Union). This gives a potential data set of 208 observations. However, the
use of lagged variables further restricts the sample period and not all data series
were available for all these countries and periods. In practice, our actual sample
varied between 143 and 179 observations.
Regression Results
Results for direct investment regressions
Regression results for foreign direct investment are shown in Table 2. Model 1
is derived by applying a general-to-specific selection process to a general model
containing all potential explanatory variables described above under the rubrics
“general determinants” and “specific determinants of direct investment,” except
for the institutional variables from the World Bank, which are not available for 5
of the 25 economies we study. First lags (and in the case of the liberalization
index, second lags as well) were included for the time-varying variables. This
brought the total number of variables in the general model to 32.
In columns (2), (3), and (4), we experiment with adding regional dummies and
(at the cost of using a smaller sample) the World Bank institutional indicators to
Model 1. Model 5, finally, shows a parsimonious model derived from a general
model that also includes the World Bank institutional indicators, and a dummy
variable for Russia, using the smaller sample.14
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13The priors on the sign of this dummy are unclear. For example, if countries with missing treasury
bill rates behave “as if” they had positive rates, then the dummy should have a negative sign; if they
behave as if they had negative rates, then the dummy should have a positive sign.
14 This smaller sample excludes Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan.Pietro Garibaldi,Nada Mora,Ratna Sahay,and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
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Table 1. Names and Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Variable Name Definition Source
Scale variables
lpop Natural log of population World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
lgdp Natural log of GDP in U.S. dollars World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
lppp Natural log of PPP-adjusted GDP World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
Macroeconomic
growth First lag of real GDP growth. World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
linfav Natural log of average annual current inflation World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
err Preannounced exchange rate regime dummy. Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Restrictions, IMF.
mcp Multiple exchange rates. Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Restrictions, IMF.
fbal General government balance as percent of GDP. World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
Structural Reform Variables
li Liberalization index De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996) and
Range from 0 to 1, where 1 denotes full  extended for 1996 and 1997 based on 
liberalization. the  EBRD indices. Refer to Berg,
Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer
(1999) for more details.
Institutional quality and the legal framework
wbpred Predictability of laws and policies World Bank, World Development Report
1997 Survey.
wbprop Political stability and security of property
wbgovbus Overall government-business interface
wbredtape Bureaucratic red tape
wbgoveff Efficiency of government in providing services
(all range from 1 to 6, 6 is worst)
Initial Conditions and Other Controls
war War dummy. Authors’ calculations.
ldist Natural log of distance from Duesseldorf (in km).Internet map locator.
natrr Natural resource abundance dummy variable Authors’ calculations.
li89 Initial liberalization index. De Melo, Denizer and Gelb (1996).
cro, rus, tkm Dummy variables for Croatia, Russia, and 
Turkmenistan respectevely.
bal Dummy variable for Baltic countries.
US3m U.S. 3-month treasury bill rate. International Financial Statistics, IMF.
Market Perception Variable
em_res Residual of Euromoney country risk rating in a  Euromoney, March and September issues 
regression on fundamentals, see text. various years.
Specific to FDI
lwage Natural log of average monthly manufacturing  OECD Short-term Economic Indicators, 
wages in US$. ILO, and IMF.
ebtrde Trade and Foreign Exchange Index; range  European Bank for Reconstruction and 
from 1 to 4, where 4 denotes comparable Development (EBRD), extended prior to 
standards to advanced economies. 1994 based on LI described above.The main results are as follows. Consider first Model 1. Note the rather good
fit (just over 0.9). The coefficients mostly confirm conventional priors. Direct
investment flows increase with good macroeconomic performance, as measured
by growth and a high fiscal balance, the state of economic liberalization (li), and
reforms in the trade area (Debtrde, which measures the change in the EBRD trade
reform index). Insider privatization (prins) discourages direct investment, as do
direct restrictions on direct investment inflows (diir–1). As expected, countries
rich in natural resources (natrr) received more direct investment—on average,
almost 60 percent compared to otherwise similar resource-poor countries. Having
an ex ante commitment to a fixed exchange rate (err2) is also positively associated
with direct investment. Finally, note that the dummy dum0 for years in which there
was zero direct investment is also highly significant and negative; this suggests
some sort of start-up cost to inflows.
Three aspects of Model 1’s predictions are unexpected. First, current inflation
(linfav) comes in with the “wrong” sign. We have no explanation for this, except
potential endogeneity, which may be an issue in spite of our efforts to avoid omitted
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Table 1. (concluded)
Variable Name Definition Source
diir Foreign direct investment restrictions index. Authors’ calculations based on Annual 
Range from –0.2 to 6 where 6 reflects most Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
restrictions. Restrictions, IMF, various issues.
prsal, prvou,  The three privatization indicators: privatization  Authors’ calculations based on EBRD 
prins by direct sale, by voucher, and insider  Transition Reports. Refer to Appendix 
respectively for detailed description of
methodology.
Specific to Portfolio Investment
ebsecse Securities market index European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Range from 1 to 4, where 4 denotes securities Development (EBRD) and extended 
laws and regulations approaching IOSCO prior to 1994 based on li described 
standards; substantial market liquidity and above.
capitalization; well-functioning nonbank
financial institutions and effective regulation.
pir Portfolio investment restrictions index.  Authors’ calculations based on Annual 
Potential range from 0 to 2, where 2 indicates Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
outright prohibition of portfolio flows. Restrictions, IMF, various issues.
rTbill0 and rTbill0 is the real treasury bill rate, where  International Financial Statistics series 
Tbilld missing observations are replaced with a 0.  60c, supplemented by IMF staff and 
Tbilld variable is a dummy that takes on the country reports
value of 1 in the cases that rates are available.
debtpc External debt per capita  World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
respc international reserves per capita, respectively World Economic Outlook database,
IMF.
stdtd ratio of short-term debt to total debt World Economic Outlook database,
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.variable problems.15 The result goes away (in the sense that contemporaneous
inflation is not significant and can be eliminated from the model) when the general-
to-specific exercise is repeated on a smaller sample that includes the World Bank
institutional variables (see Model 5). Second, after controlling for aggregate
productivity—which we do indirectly, by having both log GDP and log population
in the model—wages are insignificant and can be eliminated. Thus, in this broad
sample,16 wage costs seem to be overshadowed by more fundamental macroeco-
nomic stability and governance issues. Third, the coefficient on log GDP is only
about 0.3 and the sum of the coefficients on log population and log GDP is only
0.5—that is, far below unity. This implies that, even controlling for all other char-
acteristics that we are able to quantify, small countries were much better at
attracting direct investment as a share of GDP. A doubling of country size, keeping
everything else constant, is associated with an increase in direct investment by only
about 50 percent. One question is the extent to which this result is driven by
Russia—a very large country attracting relatively little direct investment.
This question is answered in Model 2, which includes a country dummy for
Russia and two other countries that turn out to be outliers: Croatia, which received
significantly more direct investment than Model 1 would predict, and
Turkmenistan, which received significantly less.17 The coefficient on the Russia
dummy is particularly large in absolute terms, and highly significant. Note that
when the dummies are included in the model, the coefficient on the scale variables
rises (from about 0.5 to 0.65), but remains significantly smaller than unity.
Which omitted variables might be driving the three significant country
outliers? For Croatia, war-related inflows from the Croatian community abroad
may play a role. For Russia and Turkmenistan, plausible candidates are variables
related to the business climate and governance. This seems to be supported by the
fact that the coefficient on the market perceptions residual (emres_di), which
captures investor perceptions not attributable to differences in the remaining right-
hand-side variables, drops in the presence of the three country dummies.
The next step is to directly add governance measures to the model. To do that,
we first rerun Model 2 on a smaller sample—which excludes Croatia and
Turkmenistan—for which the 1997 World Bank governance measures are avail-
able (Model 3). The results are very close to those on the whole sample. We then
add the five governance indicators. As it turns out, four of them are jointly and
individually insignificant and can be eliminated, leaving just one, wbredtape, an
index for bureaucratic red tape and corruption (Model 4). As expected, the coeffi-
cient on emres_di falls further in the presence of wbredtape, and loses statistical
significance. Surprisingly, however, the coefficient on the Russia dummy is not
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15Assuming the model is otherwise well-specified, reverse causality is not a major concern  for vari-
ables such as inflation, since DI constitutes a relatively narrow capital flow item that is unlikely to have
large simultaneous macroeconomic effects.
16In a sample that comprises only the more advanced transition countries in Central and Eastern
Europe, Bevan and Estrin (2000) and Holland and Pain (1998) do find the expected negative relationship
between labor costs and direct investment.
17These are the only robust outliers, in the sense that they remain significant when any other country
dummy is added, and that any other country dummy is insignificant when added to the world.reduced—it even rises after the inclusion of wbredtape into the model. Thus, the
puzzle of why Russia received so little direct investment is not resolved by adding
this set of governance indicators to the model.
Finally, we check whether the results so far are the same if the governance
variables are included at the beginning in the model selection process, rather than
added at a later stage. The answer is a qualified yes. Model 5 confirms the basic
story about direct investment being attracted mainly by a stable macroeconomic
environment, economic reforms, the privatization method, and the presence of
natural resources, although there are some differences in the details.18As far as the
role of governance is concerned, the results mirror those of Model 4: wbredtape is
again the only significant governance variable, and the Russia dummy stays highly
significant in spite of its presence.
The main surprise in Model 5 is the continued significance of emres_di as a
predictor of direct investment flows, which represents any information contained
in investor ratings that is not captured by the remaining right-hand-side funda-
mentals including the World Bank governance variables. There are several poten-
tial explanations for this result. The most obvious one is that to the extent that the
right-hand-side variables still do not give a full picture of the country’s funda-
mentals, these might be captured by emres_di. However, after controlling for the
governance variables, it is not clear in what respect the information set upon which
investor magazine ratings are based could be richer than the one we are already
controlling for (see the Appendix on how these ratings are constructed). Two other
related explanations that we find more plausible are as follows.
The first possibility has to do with reporting lags and errors in reflecting
economic fundamentals. Not all the information that is contained on our right-
hand side (in particular, on governance) was available when investors made their
decisions. Suppose that investors use investor magazine scores (which were avail-
able twice a year since the early 1990s for most countries) as a proxy for the
missing information. Ex post, these scores may turn out to have been wrong, in the
sense that they either overstated or understated the quality of fundamentals in a
particular country. But in the meantime, investment decisions may have been
taken, which could be costly to reverse. Thus, if investors regard investor maga-
zine scores as a “coincident indicator” of the quality of fundamentals, then the
error component of this indicator—i.e., precisely the residual used in Model 5—
should have an impact on investor decisions.
The second story relates to the problem of endogeneity, in the sense of simple
reverse causality. In other words, high investor ratings could be driven by high
observed inflows, rather than the reverse. This, however, is implausible here, since
it is lagged investor ratings that matter in Model 5, and since the regression also
controls for past inward direct investment directly. However, there may be a
second, more plausible source of endogeneity—namely, that both investor ratings
and capital inflows are to some extent driven by fads or biases, that is, by market
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18Mainly, it is the changes in the general liberalization index, Dli, that seem to matter; changes in the
specific trade liberalization index are insignificant and can be eliminated, and the impact of privatization
enters not only through an adverse effect of insider privatization, but also via a beneficial effect of direct
sales (prsal). The puzzling result is that the contemporaneous effect of inflation is insignificant.perceptions that are not really justified by fundamentals. Since these are not
directly included on the right-hand side of our regression models, they show up in
the error term, which ends up being correlated with the investor score residual,
emres_di. In principle, it should be possible to test this possibility by instru-
menting emres_di; in practice, however, instruments that are both valid and suffi-
ciently powerful are hard to find in this context.19
Regardless of which of these two stories is right, Model 5 suggests that
investor ratings contain predictive power for direct investment flows beyond the
information about fundamentals which they embody. This may be either because
they are used as imperfect proxies for economic fundamentals when direct infor-
mation on these fundamentals is not readily available, or because they reflect
market perceptions that are not attributable to fundamentals but nevertheless have
an impact on investment decisions.
Results for portfolio investment regressions
We now turn to a set of regressions which explore the determinants of inward
portfolio investment (Table 3). As explained before, negative inward investment
flows—reflecting the liquidation of positions held by foreign residents—is a
frequent occurrence in our data. This precludes log-transforming the data in the
way we did in the direct investment regression, and forces us to make a decision
in advance on whether to run the regression in terms of investment per capita terms
or investment per GDP. We did both, while additionally controlling for the scale
variable that was not chosen for normalizing the flows. As it turns out, the popu-
lation normalization fits the data better, which is not surprising given the problems
with measuring dollar GDP discussed above. This is the normalization used in the
regressions presented below. However, the conclusions of this section would not
be affected if we had instead based the discussion on the GDP normalization.
Model 1 was derived by simplifying a general model containing a total of 35
variables, which include all general and portfolio investment-specific potential
explanatory variables discussed in the preceding subsection, with lags where appro-
priate, except for the institutional indicators, which are not available for several
countries. Path dependency was a somewhat greater problem than in the direct
investment regressions. In particular, we were not able to discriminate between the
effects of lagged inflation and liberalization on portfolio investment, in the sense
that the order of elimination determines which variable ends up in the parsimonious
model. Thus, the variable “lInf–1” in Model 1 should be viewed as representative
of the quality of macroeconomic policies, rather than as literally representing infla-
tion. The remaining steps, however, go through regardless of whether the lagged
inflation or liberalization is included in the model. For this reason, we do not sepa-
rately show regressions results that include LI rather than lInf–1.
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19We tried using the EBRD’s index for the development of domestic financial markets as an instru-
ment for emres_di—which arguably was not a determinant of direct investment, since the latter occurred
mostly through direct purchases in the context of privatization or greenfield investment, and as such did
not require organized stock markets. Using this instrument, a Hausman test could not reject the hypoth-



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Given our findings for direct investment, the results of Model (1) are striking
in two respects. First, the fit is much worse than the fit of the corresponding direct
investment regression, with an R2 of approximately 0.4 as opposed to approxi-
mately 0.9. Part of this large difference is explained by the absence of a log trans-
formation in Table 3, which dampened outliers and contributed to the overall good
fit of the direct investment regressions. To get a sense of the importance of this
effect, we re-ran Model 1 of Table 2 without the log transformation, using popu-
lation for the purposes of normalization. The fit declines to 0.67, which is still
much larger than that of the portfolio investment regressions. Thus, the basic
insight is that differences in portfolio investment over time and across countries
are much harder to model, even using a very rich set of determinants, than direct
investment flows.
The second striking finding in Table 3, which is related to the first, is the rela-
tively small number of explanatory variables that seem to play any role at all.
Model 1 says that—ignoring governance indicators as a potential determinant,
portfolio investment flows seem to have a systematic relationship only with past
inflation (perhaps as a proxy for the quality of macroeconomic “housekeeping”),
investor ratings, the exchange rate regime (where pegs are associated with bigger
net inflows), the level of reserves, world interest rates, and improvements in the
securities market infrastructure (Debsecse). This list is remarkable mainly for
what it does not contain: solvency indicators such as the level of debt, economic
growth, economic reforms as distinct from macro stability, domestic real interest
rates, and direct legal restrictions to portfolio inflows.
The paucity of significant explanatory variables in the portfolio investment
regression can be given several interpretations. Poor measurement may be a
problem, both in the sense that some variables could be mismeasured (for
example, debt and domestic real interest rates), and in the sense that we have not
fully measured default risk directly, so that the domestic interest rate plays a role
both as a proxy for country risk and as a “pull” factor attracting capital flows, with
ambiguous net effects. The identification problem discussed at the beginning of
Section II almost surely plays a role as well, to the extent that the same variables
enter the demand and supply equations for portfolio assets with opposite signs. For
example, all things being equal, one would expect the supply of government bonds
to increase with an increase in the fiscal deficit but the demand for bonds to
decrease; these effects may offset each other in the estimation. Finally, our results
may indicate that portfolio inflows in transition economies were not very sensitive
to solvency indicators apart from the level of international reserves. The fact that
direct restrictions to portfolio movements do not have any explanatory power
either indicates measurement errors, or suggests that portfolio flows can find a
way around these restrictions.
Model 2 reruns Model 1 on a smaller sample that includes only the countries
for which the World Bank institutional indicators are available. The results are
very close, so the reduction of the sample itself does not have a major impact.
Based on the reduced sample, Model 3 shows the consequences of adding the
World Bank governance indicators to the model. Of the five indices, four have
almost no explanatory power, and can be eliminated from the model at extremely
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property rights, wbprop—turns out to be highly significant. The presence of
wbprop also has a substantial impact on the remaining variables in the regression.
The coefficient on reserves, in particular, drops to one-third and becomes insignif-
icant. The coefficient on emres_pi also falls substantially, as one would expect,
although it remains significant.
This leads to the question of how the results would have been affected if the
World Bank indicators had been included in the general-to-specific model selec-
tion process from the outset. The answer is quite striking (Model 4). In the pres-
ence of the governance variables, and with a slightly different parametrization of
the variable proxying the development of securities markets (ebsecse, which now
captures the level of securities markets development rather than the change), all
other country-specific variables that previously seemed to matter can be deleted
from the model without loss in explanatory power (compare the R2 of Models 4
and 2). Put differently: the only “fundamentals” that seem to have a robust effect
on portfolio investment are the presence of a securities market infrastructure, and
some confidence that the acquired assets would not be expropriated. In the pres-
ence of these two variables, no other country-specific variables (or for that matter,
the residual information contained in investor ratings) seem to contribute signifi-
cantly to explaining investment flows.
As before, we subjected the parsimonious Model 4 to a series of tests to see
to what extent it could explain outliers in the raw data. Consider first portfolio
inflows to Russia during 1997. Given what is known about the special circum-
stances driving these inflows, one would not expect a highly parsimonious,
fundamentals-based model to fit this episode. The dummy variable for Russia is
marginally significant at 5 percent. Note that the remaining coefficients are barely
affected by the inclusion of this dummy, suggesting that this particular inflow
episode was indeed unrelated to fundamentals. Next, we separately added dummy
variables for the top (Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary)20 and some of the bottom
(Bulgaria, Ukraine) portfolio investment recipients. None of these dummies are
individually significant, nor do they affect the coefficients on ebsecse and wbprop.
Only if dummies for all three top portfolio investment recipients are jointly added
to the equation does the coefficient on wbprop decline substantially and become
insignificant at the 5 percent level (not shown). Thus, the fact that these top recip-
ients also stood out in terms of their perceived protection of property rights is
indeed a factor driving the large coefficient on wbprop in Models 4 and 5.
III. Conclusions
Capital flows to transition economies have exhibited a diverse pattern in terms
of both level and composition. Since 1993, private inflows in the Central-Eastern
European countries have been high and consistently around 5–6 percent of GDP.
They have been even higher in the Baltic countries, where they averaged 10
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20Slovenia, which also attracted exceptionally large amounts of portfolio investment (see Figure 5),
is not part of this dataset because it is not covered by the 1997 World Bank governance indicators.percent of GDP since 1995. Other regions, such as Southeastern Europe and most
CIS countries, witnessed lower and less stable inflows, and private flows to Russia
were generally negative. Official flows and “exceptional financing” (arrears
rescheduling and debt forgiveness) were important sources of financing in most
countries during the early transition years, and continued to play an important role
in most CIS countries at least until 1998.
Foreign direct investment was a large, relatively stable source of private
financing in most transition economies. In contrast, portfolio investment inflows
were generally smaller, much more volatile, and concentrated in half a dozen coun-
tries in Central-Eastern Europe, Russia (before 1998) and recently the Baltics.
“Other” private investment, reflecting mainly bank lending, takes an intermediate
position. It was an important source of net funds, surpassing direct investment in
some countries. Also, it was generally more volatile than direct investment,
although less volatile than portfolio investment. Russia is again an exception. It
received relatively little foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP, but
instead large portfolio inflows (until 1998). Moreover, “other” investment flows to
Russia were consistently large and negative, perhaps reflecting capital flight.
The regression results indicate that the pattern of inward direct investment in
transition economies can be well explained in terms of a standard set of economic
fundamentals. These include variables reflecting macroeconomic stability, the
level of economic reforms, trade liberalization, natural resource endowments, the
privatization method, direct barriers to inward direct investment, and a measure of
government “red tape” that reflects obstacles to investment and entrepreneurship
and is closely related to corruption. Unlike some of the earlier papers on Central
and Eastern Europe, we do not find that wages have a robust effect on direct
investment flows in our sample. With the exception of natural resource endow-
ments, initial conditions—such as time under communism, or initial liberaliza-
tion—also seem to have no effect (other than through their possible effect on
policy choices). Interestingly, investor perceptions of the risk or attractiveness of
a country—as measured by investor magazine ratings—seem to have some predic-
tive value over and above their information about fundamentals, perhaps because
they reflect investor biases or fads that also affect capital flows.
In contrast, portfolio investment is very poorly explained by fundamentals. In
part, this may be due to measurement problems or the problem of disentangling
the determinants of demand and supply of portfolio assets when secondary asset
markets are still very small. The only country characteristics that seem to be robust
predictors of portfolio investment are the presence of a financial market infra-
structure (as measured by an index of securities markets development) and an indi-
cator of the protection of property rights. In the presence of these two variables,
none of the many other country fundamentals we control for has any robust, statis-
tically significant, explanatory role. Thus, our findings endorse the commonly
expressed view that the quality of governance was an important factor in attracting
capital flows. For direct investment, this is one important variable among several
others. For portfolio investment, it seems to be just about the only country charac-
teristic that helps to fit a volatile series, which otherwise bears no systematic rela-
tionship to country fundamentals.
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Compilation of Explanatory Variables Used in Regressions
Restrictions on Capital Flows
We  quantified the existence and magnitude of capital controls in transition
economies on the basis of qualitative information reported in the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Restrictions. For each country we
constructed separate indices of restrictions on foreign direct investments and port-
folio investments, as well as a composite index of overall restrictions, using the
qualitative information reported under the subcategory “Capital Account.”
The average values of the indices are reported in Table A1 for all countries in
our sample. Larger values indicate larger restrictions on flows. The categories
covered by the index of direct investment restrictions are approval requirements,
the extent to which profits can be remitted abroad, ease in liquidating assets, and
preferential treatment of direct investment.21 The index ranged from –0.2 to 6,
where 6 reflects the most restrictive environment for direct investment. The table
shows that Estonia had the least restrictive environment, with an overall negative
value for the direct investment index, due to the absence of direct investment
restrictions and the existence of subsidies to foreign direct investment inflows. At
the opposite end of the scale is Belarus, whose direct investment regulations are
the most restrictive.
The index of portfolio restrictions was constructed based on the 1997–2000
issues of the IMF’s Report (which in fact cover the years 1996–99 respectively).
Prior to these issues, the Report did not contain a sufficiently detailed discussion
of controls on capital and money market instruments. To deal with this, we
assumed that the measure constructed for 1996 could have also applied to the
earlier years; this implies that there is very little time variation in this data. The
index rates both inward and outward controls according to their restrictiveness (no
approval requirement, registration, approval, and outright prohibition). As shown
in Table A2, the Baltic countries are the most open while the other FSU countries
are the most restrictive; Russia is less restrictive than the average Central-Eastern
European country.
Market Perceptions
Market perceptions of “country risk” are represented by ratings of international
private companies such as the Institutional Investor, Euromoney, and the Economist
Intelligence Unit. We  used the ratings issued by Euromoney because it provides
virtually complete coverage of the transition economies during our sample period.
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21A detailed description on how these categories were weighted and rated is available from the
authors on request.Since each publication issues its ratings twice a year (in March and in September),
we constructed simple annual averages based on the two published ratings. For both
series, ratings range from 1 to 100, where 100 represents the best rating.
The Euromoney ratings are computed on the basis of assessments of country-
risk experts using the following nine weighted categories: economic performance
(25 percent), political risk (25 percent), external debt indicators (10 percent), debt
in default or rescheduled (10 percent), credit ratings (10 percent), access to bank
finance (5 percent), access to short-term finance (5 percent), access to capital
markets (5 percent), and discount on forfeiting (5 percent). The average rating for
the transition countries for the period 1999 was 38.6 out of a total of 100. Table
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Table A1. All Transition Economies: Indices of Restrictions on Capital Flows
Direct Investment  Portfolio Investment Composite
Restrictions Restrictions Index,
Index, average 93–99 Index, average 96–99 average 96–99a
Albania 1.80 1.00 1.40
Armenia 0.43 0.00 0.00
Azerbaijan 0.80 0.63 0.71
Belarus 3.37 1.00 1.90
Bulgaria 1.27 0.38 1.01
Croatia 0.94 0.63 0.79
Czech Republic 0.29 0.09 0.05
Estonia –0.03 0.00 0.00
Georgia 0.80 0.50 0.65
Hungary 1.12 0.44 0.62
Kazakhstan 2.64 1.00 1.70
Kyrgyz Republic 1.37 1.00 0.95
Latvia 1.40 0.00 0.50
Lithuania 2.80 0.00 1.40
Macedonia 0.80 0.88 0.84
Moldova 3.11 0.63 1.56
Poland 1.64 0.46 1.03
Romania 2.80 1.00 1.90
Russia 2.57 0.63 1.81
Slovak Republic 0.82 0.61 0.75
Slovenia 1.79 0.71 1.35
Tajikistan 1.80 1.00 2.00
Turkmenistan 2.80 1.00 1.90
Ukraine 1.80 1.00 1.40
Uzbekistan 2.80 1.00 1.90
Central and Eastern Europe  1.33 0.62 0.97
Baltic countries 1.39 0.00 0.63
Russia 2.57 0.63 1.81
Other countries of the former
Soviet Union 1.98 0.80 1.33
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Restrictions.
aComposite is an equally weighted sum of direct investment and portfolio restrictions for 1997.A2 (first column) shows that the Central and Eastern European countries and the
Baltics scored much better than Russia and other FSU countries.
Institutional and Legal Proxies
For institutional and legal proxies that capture governance-type issues and the
existence of red tape, we use a World Bank data set compiled for the World
Development Report in 1997. It is based on a cross-country survey of firms (local
or with foreign participation). The aim of the survey was to capture the institu-
tional uncertainty within a particular country from the viewpoint of local
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Table A2. All Transition Economies: Average Country Scores from
Euromoney (1999) and World Bank Surveya
Euromoney Survey across all Survey across firms
total ratingb firmsc with foreign participationc
Albania 18.05 3.70 3.81
Armenia 25.43 3.68 3.70
Azerbaijan 33.38 4.03 3.71
Belarus 28.40 4.33 4.07
Bulgaria 38.60 4.40 n.a.
Czech Republic 61.41 3.40 3.39
Estonia 54.32 3.33 3.14
Georgia 26.25 3.84 3.79
Hungary 65.01 3.30 3.22
Kazakhstan 40.49 4.14 4.17
Kyrgyz Republic 32.83 4.05 4.06
Latvia 50.54 3.77 3.85
Lithuania 49.44 3.76 3.62
Macedonia 24.16 3.49 3.09
Moldova 30.91 4.08 4.15
Poland 62.31 3.66 3.71
Russia 21.94 3.95 3.90
Slovak Republic 48.69 3.78 3.80
Ukraine 30.28 4.11 3.94
Uzbekistan 29.29 4.13 4.12
Averages
All 38.58 3.85 3.75
Central and Eastern Europe 45.46 3.68 3.50
Baltic countries 51.43 3.62 3.54
Russia 21.94 3.95 3.90
Other countries of the 
former Soviet Union 30.80 4.04 3.97
Source: World Bank World Development Report 1997 Private Sector Survey, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/wdr97.htm; authors’ computations.
aSurveys for Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan were not conducted.
bRatings range from 1 to 100, where 100 represented the best rating or the least chance of default.
cScores were averaged based on a 1 to 6 scale where 6 represented the worst perception of
domestic institutional constraints.entrepreneurs, as opposed to the opinion of Western or international experts. The
survey also recorded size, location, and whether or not the responding firm had
foreign participation.22
The survey was divided into 5 broad sections. The first is “predictability of
laws and policies”—whether changes in laws and policies are uncertain and
whether the government takes into account concerns raised by business. The
second is “political instability and security of property”—whether there is uncer-
tainty in the political process and whether that has an impact on business decisions
and property rights. The third, “overall government-business interface,” asks
participants to judge whether there are strong obstacles in certain policy areas like
inflation, corruption, tax regulations etc. The fourth, “bureaucratic red tape,” aims
to evaluate the frequency, severity, and uncertainty of “additional payments” that
need to be made. Finally, the survey asks for a rating of the efficiency of govern-
ment in providing services such as customs, roads, and telecommunications.
The responses to each of the questions was converted into a 1 to 6 numerical
scale, where 6 represented the worst perception of domestic institutional
constraints. To obtain a general perception of each of the five categories and a total
country score, we average the five sections’responses, and in Table A3 (third and
fourth columns), we report the final country scores based on all and foreign partic-
ipation averages. The average for all the transition countries surveyed based on
averaging across all firms was 3.85 while it was 3.75 when based on averaging
across firms with foreign participation. In general Central and Eastern Europe and
the Baltic countries scored best, followed by Russia and the other countries of the
former Soviet Union. Interestingly, firms with foreign participation rated all
subgroups better than all firms. Also interesting is the fact that while all firms rated
Central and Eastern Europe better than the Baltic countries, firms with foreign
participation did not.
In our regressions modeling portfolio investment, we also used an EBRD
index of the degree of development of security markets and nonbank financial
institutions. For this index, 1 reflects little progress; 2 implies that securities
exchanges and brokers have been set up along with some trading in bonds and
securities, although the legal and regulatory framework dealing with such trading
is still in its early stages; 3 reflects a large degree of private issues together with a
more advanced legal framework, and the emergence of nonbank financial institu-
tions like pension funds; and 4 means a highly developed market. The regional
averages for this index exhibit little time variance. The other FSU countries lag
behind at 1.5 while the Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltics average 2.3. Russia
jumped to a rating of 3 in 1996, putting it at the same level of development as the
more advanced Central-Eastern Europe countries, such as the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland.
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22For more details, see the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report and Brunetti, Kisunko, and
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Table A3. Dummy Variables for Privatization Method
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Albania directa 0 000000 . 5 000
voucherb 0 000011000 . 5
insiderc 0 000000001
Armenia directa 0 0000000 . 2 5 01
voucherb 0 000011110
insiderc 0 00000 . 5 0 . 50 . 50 . 50
Azerbaijan directa 0 00000000 . 5 0
voucherb 0 000000110
insiderc 0 0000000 . 5 00
Belarus directa 0 000000000
voucherb 0 000000000
insiderc 0 001111000
Bulgaria directa 0 000000 . 5 111
voucherb 0 0000010 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5
insiderc 0 000000000
Croatia directa 0 000000000
voucherb 0 000000011
insiderc 0 011111100
Czech directa 00 0 . 50 .5 0.5 1 1 1 0.5 1
Republic voucherb 0 01110 . 5 0010
insider c 0 000000000
Estonia directa 0 001111111
voucherb 0 000 . 5 0 . 50 . 50 . 50 . 50 0
insiderc 0 000000000
Georgia directa 0 000000111
voucherb 0 000011000
insiderc 0 00000 . 5 0 . 5 000
Hungary directa 1 111111111
voucherb 0 000000000
insiderc 0 000000000
Kazakhstan directa 0 000 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 1110
voucherb 0 001110 . 5 0 . 5 00
insiderc 0 000000000
Kyrgyztan directa 0 00000 . 5 0 . 50 . 51 0
voucherb 0 000011100
insiderc 0 011100000
Latvia directa 0 0000 . 5 0 . 5 0.5 0.5 1 0
voucherb 0 000111100
insiderc 0 000000000
Lithuania directa 0 00000 . 5 1111
voucherb 0 011110000
insiderc 00 0 . 50 . 50.5 00000
Macedonia, directa 0 000000000 . 5
FYR voucherb 0 000000000
insiderc 0 001111111
Moldova directa 0 00000 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 11
voucherb 0 000111000
insiderc 0 000000000
Poland directa 00 . 2 5 0 .25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 1
voucherb 0 000011100
insiderc 1 11110 . 5 0 . 5 0 . 5 00Indicators of the Privatization Method
To characterize the privatization method, we constructed three indicator vari-
ables:  prsal (privatization through direct sales), prvou (privatization through
auctions involving vouchers, this is sometimes referred to as “mass privatization”),
and  prins (insider privatization—either voucher privatizations with significant
concessions to insiders, or management-employee buyouts). Following the
approach used by the EBRD in their 1997 summary of privatization methods,23 we
assigned a value of 1 to the series if the method it was supposed to characterize
constituted the “primary” privatization method during this year; a 0.5 if it consti-
tuted the “secondary” privatization method; and a 0.25 if it constituted the
“tertiary” method. If no privatization at all took place, all three indices were
assigned a value of 0.
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Table A3. (concluded)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Romania directa 0 000 . 5 0 . 5 0 .5 0.25 0.5 0 1
voucherb 0 000001100
insiderc 0 001110 . 5 000
Russia directa 0 0000 . 25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0
voucherb 0 0110 . 5 00000
insiderc 0 000111100
Slovak directa 00 0 . 5 0 . 50 . 5 0 .5 0.5 0.5 1 0
voucherb 0 01110 . 2 50 . 2 50 . 2 50 0
insiderc 0 0000 . 2 5 11100
Slovenia directa 0 00000 . 2 5 0 .25 0.25 0.25 0.25
voucherb 0 00000 . 5 0 . 5 0 .5 0.5 0.5
insiderc 0 000011111
Tajikistan directa 0 000000011
voucherb 0 000000 . 5 0 . 5 00
insiderc 0 110001100
Turkmenistan directa 0 000000011
voucherb 0 000000000
insiderc 0 000000000
Ukraine directa 0 000000 . 25 0.25 0.5 0.5
voucherb 0 00000 . 5 1111
insiderc 0 011010 . 5 0 . 5 00
Uzbekistan directa 0 000000000
voucherb 0 000000 . 5 0 . 5 00
insiderc 0 000111100
a“direct” refers to privatization through direct sales.
b“voucher” refers to privatization through auctions involving vouchers (also known as “mass
privitization”).
c“insider” refers to insider privitization—either voucher privatization with significant concessions
to insider, or management-employee buyouts.
23 1997 Transition Report, Table 5.7.Our basic source on how each country privatized in each year was the EBRD’s
chronicle of large scale privatization as it appears in the country summaries of
each Transition Report. We chose this over a pure cross-sectional index (which
could have been derived directly and much more easily from the EBRD’s 1997
summary of privatization methods) because we wanted to capture important
changes in the privatization method over time. For example, a switch from, say,
insider privatization to sales to outsiders could have led to a spike in direct invest-
ment, which a purely cross-sectional variable would be unable to explain. The
disadvantage is that our classification necessarily involves some judgment, over
and above the judgment applied by the EBRD itself. The resulting three series are
reproduced in Table A3.
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